Russian Relapse
Washington Post, April 21, 2004
By Masha Lipman
Masha Lipman, editor of the Carnegie Moscow Center's Pro et Contra Journal, writes a monthly column for The Post.
MOSCOW -- The conviction and prison sentence of Igor Sutyagin this month
offers more evidence of how Russia's judicial system is falling under
the control of the executive branch. Sutyagin, an arms control
researcher, was sentenced to 15 years on trumped-up charges of
espionage. His case raises many of the same concerns as that of Mikhail
Khodorkovsky, the jailed oil
tycoon. Defense lawyers in these cases increasingly find themselves
under strong pressure from the prosecution and state security agencies.
Both cases mock President Vladimir Putin's stated commitment to the rule
of law, and they devalue the progress of judicial reform.
One of the major defects of the Soviet judiciary was the dependency of
its judges on the Communist Party. Only the Communist bosses were seen
to possess the ultimate truth about guilt and innocence. Thus, those who
were prosecuted and tried were almost inevitably found guilty.
In the post-Communist years judicial reform has had its ups and down,
but progress toward true rule of law has been undeniable. The criminal
and the procedural codes have become more humane, and independent
lawyers have become an important factor of Russian life; they have
repeatedly demonstrated that they can make a difference. The jury trials
eliminated by the Bolsheviks have been reintroduced, providing hope for
better justice. Though independent judges, immune to corruption, are
still a goal rather than a reality, the state appeared to have lost its
unquestioned authority over the judicial branch.
This was well illustrated by several cases -- those of environmentalists
Grigory Pasko and Alexander Nikitin, diplomat Valentin Moiseev,
physicist Valentin Danilov and a few others -- prosecuted by the state
security service (the FSB) for espionage. Reviving the old Soviet
mentality -- all foreign contacts are suspicious, and suspect
individuals must be repressed
-- the FSB brought charges in these cases with the cooperation of
sympathetic state prosecutors. But as each case reached the courtroom,
the defense demonstrated that the charges were flimsy and far-fetched,
and the prosecution was defeated. Even if the judges didn't acquit the
defendants for fear of antagonizing the FSB, they showed a certain
degree of independence by coming up with compromise rulings -- generally
soft sentences that allowed defendants to walk out of the courtroom
after the verdict.
Putin has turned the security and law enforcement bodies into pillars of
his government. The Kremlin, in its struggle against political enemies,
has been resorting to the services of the prosecutor's office and the
FSB. The prosecution of Khodorkovsky, the Kremlin's No. 1 enemy, has
been a succession of blatant procedural violations. It is apparently
understood by both the prosecution and the judge that the president
wants Khodorkovsky locked up (he has been in custody since October), and
they have acted accordingly, with little regard for the case his lawyers
present. Two other people associated with Khodorkovsky and his business
have spent even more time in jail. Defense lawyers in these cases have
been searched, harassed and threatened with prosecution.
The charges against Sutyagin were based on analytical papers on defense
issues that he wrote for a British company, an act he never denied. The
defense had solid evidence that every piece of information contained in
Sutyagin's papers had been published and was available to anyone who
wanted to read it. Moreover, Sutyagin never had access to state secrets.
The charges against Sutyagin appeared as hollow as those against his
predecessor "spy" suspects, and it seemed likely that he, too, would
walk out of the courtroom, especially because a jury was hearing his
case.
It turned out, however, that even the jury trial can be turned into a
mock institution when superior political will and "accusatory bias"
substitute for justice. The judge worded questions to the jurors in a
way that pushed them to give "appropriate" answers. For instance, she
omitted the word "secret" in asking the jurors whether Sutyagin handed
over materials for money. Defense lawyers lodged objections, but the
judge dismissed them. Talking to me 10 days after the sentence, Boris
Kuznetsov, a lawyer for Sutyagin, called the actions of the judge
"misleading and manipulating" toward the jurors. "We did not lose this
case," Kuznetsov added, "because this was not an adversary proceeding.
This was not a duel; it was a stab in the back."
Sutyagin's lawyers have appealed to the Supreme Court, complaining about
the judge's actions. For the time being, however, the "accusatory bias"
of Sutyagin's judge has done more than ruin the life of a talented
scholar and his family. It has discredited the Russian judicial system
and put in doubt the newly introduced institution of jury trials. The
Supreme Court decision will come as a critical test: Can the judiciary,
at least at its topmost level, act independently or will the state
security apparatus further consolidate its hold?
